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FINDING A “CURE”: HOW MUCH INTEREST IS ENOUGH 
FOR A CHAPTER 11 CURE? 
ABSTRACT 
Default-rate interest can quickly and easily amount to millions of dollars. In a 
chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, default-rate interest can jeopardize a 
plan’s chances at confirmation. As one commentator described, “[i]n a 
bankruptcy case, interest is the tail of the dog, but it is a long tail and it wags a 
lot.”1 Default-rate interest—interest triggered by breach of a contractual 
obligation—implicates both a determination of claim’s status and the claim’s 
ultimate confirmation. In August 2015, a panel of judges on the Eleventh 
Circuit ruled on the matter, creating a circuit split for a brief time until a Ninth 
Circuit panel addressed the question in 2016. Last year, the Ninth Circuit 
eliminated the split. While the Eleventh Circuit three-judge panel was 
unanimous, the Ninth Circuit decision split two-to-one, with a fiery dissent. 
The Ninth Circuit decision also reversed a previous decision by another panel. 
All circuits agree the plain language of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, an 
amendment Congress added in 1994 to overrule a Supreme Court case, allows 
for collection of default interest. The circuits previously disagreed, however, 
whether Congress intended a requirement for “cure” to be payment of interest 
at the default rate. This Comment explains why both panels are incorrect.  
  
                                                 
 1 Dean Pawlowic, Entitlement to Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 149, 150 
(1995). 
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INTRODUCTION 
An August 2015 decision by the Eleventh Circuit briefly created a circuit 
split on an issue of importance to many debtors in chapter 11 bankruptcy.2 The 
split concerns whether, under § 1123 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”), a 
debtor who has defaulted on a loan must pay interest at the contractual default 
rate to cure the default.3 The Eleventh Circuit ultimately held in the affirmative 
and ruled for the creditors, joining several other circuits.4 In contrast, federal 
courts within the Ninth Circuit, most notable among them the Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit, had, until November 2016, continued to 
construe the statute consistent with their previous holdings issued before the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.5 The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision resolved 
the split but did not assuage concerns that the holding of both courts is 
incorrect. Disputes and disagreements regarding statutory construction, the 
importance (or lack thereof) of congressional intent, and general Code 
interpretation are at the core of this issue. 
This Comment will argue the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation frustrates 
Congress’s pro-debtor amendment and creates unnecessary tension within the 
Code. While the Ninth Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit in demanding 
default-rate interest to satisfy a cure, a judge on the panel dissented. Her 
dissent offers a cogent explanation for the majority’s error.  
First, this Comment will explore the broader purpose of chapter 11 
bankruptcy and fully explain the two most relevant statutory provisions. 
Following the introduction, this Comment will proceed in three parts by (1) 
detailing the recent Eleventh and Ninth Circuit cases; (2) surveying 
jurisprudence both before and after the seminal Code amendments in 1994; and 
                                                 
 2 JPMCC 2006-LDP7 Miami Beach Lodging, LLC v. Sagamore Partners, Ltd. (In re Sagamore Partners, 
Ltd.), 610 F. App’x 922, 930 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 3 Id.  
 4 Id.; see Southland Corp. v. Toronto-Dominion (In re Southland Corp.), 160 F.3d 1054, 1059–60 (5th 
Cir. 1998). 
 5 See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc. (In re Entz-White Lumber & 
Supply, Inc.), 850 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that debtor could cure debt that naturally matured 
prepetition by paying arrearages at predefault rate of interest); In re Udhus, 218 B.R. 513, 518 (9th Cir. BAP 
1998); In re Phoenix Bus. Park Ltd. P’ship, 257 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001); In re Zamani, 390 B.R. 680 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008). But see In re Moody Nat’l SHS Houston H, LLC, 426 B.R. 667, 676 (Bankr. 
S.D.Tex. 2010) (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit and holding that, due to § 1123(d)—which provides that 
the amount necessary to cure a default shall be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and 
applicable nonbankruptcy law—the plan must provide for payment of default interest); In re Sweet, 369 B.R. 
644 (Bankr. D. Col. 2007) (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit and holding that, where the default interest rate 
was not considered a penalty, default interest was appropriate to effectuate a § 1124(2)(A) cure).  
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(3) exploring Congress’s motivation for enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1994. Next, this Comment will discuss and analyze the differing approaches 
taken by the circuit courts. Finally, a proposed hybrid approach—as well as a 
call for Congress to clarify its intent—will be offered. 
A. Purpose of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, the “ultimate goal of Chapter 11 is to 
marshall [sic] [] resources to provide the best possible opportunity for a 
successful rehabilitation which will ultimately redound to the benefit of all 
creditors.”6 One of the primary benefits of a chapter 11 bankruptcy is 
permitting a business to continue operations so as to not disrupt the economic 
fabric of the community.7 Indeed, protecting the business and ensuring its 
continued operation and survival is in the best interest of both the creditor(s) 
and the public generally.8 Not only does protecting the business ensure its 
viability, but it also increases the likelihood of creditors receiving more on 
debts owed. To effectuate that goal, obtaining confirmation of a reorganization 
plan is imperative,9 and the Code delegates “broad equitable powers” to courts 
“to balance the interests of the affected parties” to successfully confirm a 
reorganization plan.10 
Figure 1, below, displays the various Code provisions and their 
applicability and importance to understanding the circuit split. The following 
                                                 
 6 Varsity Carpet Servs. v. Richardson (In re Colortex Indus.), 19 F.3d 1371, 1377 (11th Cir. 1994). But 
cf. In re Moody Nat., 426 B.R. at 675 (citing Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 
51 (2008)) (“At its most fundamental level, a business bankruptcy case is designed to maximize the returns to 
creditors holding claims against the estate, while allowing a debtor to reorganize.”). 
 7 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.) (stating 
that “continued operation can save the jobs of employees, the tax base of communities, and generally reduce 
the upheaval that can result from termination of a business”). 
 8 CHRISTOPHER S. STRICKLAND & W. HOMER DRAKE JR., CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS § 12:1 (2d ed. 
2017). 
 9 See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the 
Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 611 (2009). But see Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11: Changes in Chapter 11 
Success Levels Since 1980, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 989, 993 (2015) (arguing Warren and Westbrook’s argument 
“overvalues confirmation as a criterion and conflates it with other success criteria, particularly plan 
performance and business survival”) The authors of the two articles do not, however, disagree on the 
importance of “business survival.” LoPucki, supra, at 998–99; Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A 
Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 887, 946 (2000) (“Analysis of random 
bankruptcy cases indicates that pragmatic interpretive methods continue to be the norm in the bankruptcy 
field.”). 
 10 Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389 (1993).  
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discussion details a summary of the existing Code and several of its pertinent 
intricacies. 
1. Impaired Versus Unimpaired Creditors Under § 1124 
Determining which claims or classes of claims are impaired and 
unimpaired is important for the viability of a reorganization plan.11 Impaired 
creditors under chapter 11 have a right to vote on whether to accept a 
reorganization plan; unimpaired creditors, however, do not have this right.12 
Unimpaired creditors are “conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan.”13 
Section 1124 describes two exceptions in which a class of claims or interest is 
considered unimpaired.14 In the first exception, a claim is considered 
unimpaired if the plan “leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual 
rights to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or 
interest.”15 Under the second exception, a claim is considered unimpaired if a 
creditor receives accelerated payment of claim or interest and the default is 
“cured,” among other requirements.16  
By objecting, an impaired creditor can prevent or substantially thwart a 
reorganization plan from being approved by the court, especially when there is 
only one creditor.17 To determine if a claim or interest is impaired, one must 
examine § 1124 of the Code, which states that: 
[A] class of claims or interests is impaired under a plan unless, with 
respect to each claim or interest of such class, the plan— 
(1) leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights 
to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such 
claim or interest; or 
                                                 
 11 A class of claims or interests may be impaired in one of two ways: (1) where the plan alters the legal, 
equitable, or contractual rights of the claim or interest holders; (2) where the plan fails to: cure defaults, rein-
state the mature of claims or interests, compensate the claim or interest holders for any damages, or otherwise 
impairs the rights of the holders. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, ¶ 1124.1. 
 12 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2012). 
 13 Id.; see also David Gray Carlson, Postdefault Interest Rates in Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 617, 
644. 
 14 See 11 U.S.C. § 1124. 
 15 Id.  
 16 Id. § 1124(2)(A). 
 17 See id. § 1126(c), (d) (“A class of interests has accepted a plan if such plan has been accepted by 
holders of such interests . . . that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of the 
allowed interests . . . .”). Courts have additionally held that in spite of no objection, courts must independently 
determine if the plan satisfies all necessary requirements for confirmation. In re William, 850 F.2d 250, 253 
(5th Cir. 1988) (quoting In re Holthoff, 58 B.R. 216, 218 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985)).  
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(2) notwithstanding any contractual provision or applicable 
law that entitles the holder of such claim or interest to demand 
or receive accelerated payment of such claim or interest after 
the occurrence of a default— 
(A) cures any such default that occurred before or after 
the commencement of the case under this title, other 
than a default of a kind specified in section 365(b)(2) of 
this title or of a kind that section 365(b)(2) expressly 
does not require to be cured; 
B) reinstates the maturity of such claim or interest as 
such maturity existed before such default; 
(C) compensates the holder of such claim or interest for 
any damages incurred as a result of any reasonable 
reliance by such holder on such contractual provision or 
such applicable law; 
(D) if such claim or such interest arises from any failure 
to perform a nonmonetary obligation, other than a 
default arising from failure to operate a nonresidential 
real property lease subject to section 365(b)(1)(A), 
compensates the holder of such claim or such interest 
(other than the debtor or an insider) for any actual 
pecuniary loss incurred by such holder as a result of 
such failure; and 
(E) does not otherwise alter the legal, equitable, or 
contractual rights to which such claim or interest 
entitles the holder of such claim or interest.18 
This provision provides debtors with two alternatives in which otherwise 
impaired claims can be considered unimpaired. The second alternative, in 
§ 1124(2), provides for five additional requirements (other than the 
requirements found in § 1124(2)(A)) that a debtor must satisfy to render a 
claim unimpaired.19 Each of these additional requirements renders the creditor 
whole in some way and ensures the claims retain “all of their prepetition legal, 
equitable, and contractual rights against the debtor.”20 The legislative history 
behind the amendments sheds light on this provision. As the Senate Report on 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (“the Act”) noted, a “claim or interest is 
                                                 
 18 11 U.S.C. § 1124. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. Lasalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 441 n.14 (1999) 
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 1124). 
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unimpaired by curing the effect of a default and reinstating the original terms 
of an obligation.”21 
2. Contents of a Plan: Requirements and Options under § 1123 
Section 1123(a) prescribes the requirements for what a chapter 11 
bankruptcy plan must include.22 One requirement is that the plan “provide 
adequate means for the plan’s implementation, such as . . . curing or waiving [] 
any default.”23 Section 1123(b) sets forth optional elements of what a plan 
“may” do, subject to § 1123(a).24 Subsection (c) applies to an individual 
debtor’s property exempted under § 522.25 Section 1123 did not contain any 
reference to “cure” until Congress passed the Act. Under the Act, Congress 
amended § 1123, adding subsection (d) to require that any cure accord with the 
underlying contract and nonbankrupty law.26 
In 1994, in an effort to expressly overrule a Supreme Court case, Rake v. 
Wade,27 Congress prescribed how a plan may “cure” a default and importantly, 
included the same definition of “cure” in three sections: §§ 1123, 1222, and 
1322.28 The definition provides: 
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section and sections 506(b), 
1129(a)(7), and 1129(b) of this title, if it is proposed in a plan to cure 
a default the amount necessary to cure the default shall be determined 
in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.29 
Notably (and confusingly), Congress did not include the same language in 
§ 1124 to define cure. Creditors, seizing on the new definition, sought to apply 
                                                 
 21 S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) 120, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1978, pp. 5787, 
5906. 
 22 See 11 U.S.C. § 1123. 
 23 Id. § 1123(a)(5)(G).  
 24 See id. § 1123(b). 
 25 Id. § 1123(c). 
 26 Ralph Brubaker, Default Rates of Interest and Cure of a Defaulted Debt in a Chapter 11 Plan of Reor-
ganization (Part I): Entz-White’s Overlooked Choice of Law Dimension, BANKR. L. LETTER (Thomson Reu-
ters, Saint Paul, Minn.), Dec. 2016, Westlaw, 36 No. 12 Bankruptcy Law Letter NL 1. 
 27 508 U.S. 464 (1993) (affirming the determination that respondent over-secured creditor was not enti-
tled to interest on arrearages that petitioner debtors agreed to pay in their bankruptcy plans because the provi-
sions of the Code entitled respondent to that amount of interest despite the terms of petitioners’ debt instru-
ments). 
 28 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 1994 Enacted H.R. 5116, 103 Enacted H.R. 5116, 108 Stat. 4106, 
4134. 
 29 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d). 
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the § 1123 definition to the § 1124(2)(A) context, arguing that defaults should 
be cured consistent with the “underlying agreement and applicable 
nonbankrupcty law.”30 In doing so, creditors took what many commentators 
believed to be a pro-debtor amendment and used it to their own advantage. As 
a result, some courts apply § 1123’s prescription of what constitutes a cure, 
while others continue to acknowledge the common law definition of cure in the 
context of § 1124.31 
Figure 132 
Statute  Application to chapter 11 cure  
§ 502  Allowance or disallowance of claims 
§ 1123(a)(5)(G)  Permits a plan to include a provision 
for the curing or waiving of any 
default 
§ 1123(d) Code provision at issue  
§ 1124(2) Defines whether a claim is impaired 
§ 1126(f) Provides a conclusive presumption 
that a class of holders of unimpaired 
claims has accepted the plan 
§ 1129 Sets forth the chapter 11 confirmation 
standards  
  
3. Development of Cure’s Definition 
The Code does not define “cure.”33 Prior to the Act, “courts typically 
looked for guidance to § 1124’s discussion of what constitutes an impaired 
claim.”34 Courts often fashioned their own definition, relying upon § 1124 as a 
                                                 
 30 Id. 
 31 Compare In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 620 F. App’x 864, 868–69 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Thus, under 
§ 1124, any outstanding default-rate interest is ignored when determining whether a claim to a loan is 
impaired, but, as explained above, under § 1123, outstanding default-rate interest, if called for in the 
underlying agreement, precludes reinstating the original terms of the loan.”), with In re Moody Nat. SHS 
Houston H, LLC, 426 B.R. 667, 671–72 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 2010) (holding that outstanding interest is not 
ignored when determining whether a claim is impaired).  
 32 In re Moody Nat., 426 B.R. at 670. 
 33 In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 871 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc., 850 F.2d 
1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988). There appears to be some confusion among courts regarding whether the Code 
now defines “cure.” Compare In re Liberty Warehouse Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 220 B.R. 546, 548 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“The Bankruptcy Code does not define ‘cure.’”), with In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 2015 
U.S. App. LEXIS 15382, at *9 (stating that “cure” was undefined in the Code until 1994). 
 34 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 620 F. App’x at 868–69 (citing In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, 850 
F.2d at 1340); see also 11 U.S.C. §1124. 
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springboard to define cure in the § 1123 context.35 Appellate courts also 
developed a definition of “cure” when they adjudicated chapter 13 cases; their 
approach is informative for the purpose of defining “cure” within chapter 11.36 
For instance, the Second Circuit held, in a chapter 13 dispute, that one cures a 
default37 by “taking care of the triggering event and returning to pre-default 
conditions.”38 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that a cure permits a debtor to 
pay or bring current arrearages on the debt and reinstate it.39 
The Ninth Circuit largely applied the Second Circuit’s definition and its 
own definition of chapter 13 “cure” to the chapter 11 context, stating the 
“underlying concept of cure is the same throughout the Bankruptcy Code.”40 
The Seventh Circuit in In re Clark found that a claim was “cured” in the 
chapter 13 context when the debtor “remed[ied] or rectif[ied] the default and 
restore[d] matters to the status quo ante.”41 Four months later, the Seventh 
Circuit cited its fresh precedent in a chapter 11 case, holding that § 1124 
allows a debtor to “reinstate the original terms of the [] agreement, without 
impairing the creditor’s claim.”42 
                                                 
 35 Id. at 866 (citation omitted); see In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, 850 F.2d at 1342 (“[T]he power 
to cure under the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a plan to nullify all consequences of default, including 
avoidance of default penalties such as higher interest). But see In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d 1054, 1059 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (“The intent to effect a ‘cure’ could not be inferred from § 1124”). 
 36 See In re Metz, 820 F.2d 1495, 1497 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that the cure provisions of chapter 13 
allow “the debtor to ‘cure’ (i.e., pay or bring current) arrearages on the debt and thereby reinstate the debt.”); 
In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 872 (determining that “cure” means to restore matters to the status quo ante). The 
definitions fashioned in both In re Metz and In re Clark arose in the context of chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, 
but they remained relevant to the definition of “cure” for the purposes of chapter 11. See In re Entz-White 
Lumber & Supply, 850 F.2d at 1339–40 n.1 (“Taddeo, Metz, and Clark involve cure under Chapter 13, rather 
than Chapter 11. Although Chapter 13 restricts allowable cures in ways that Chapter 11 does not, the 
underlying concept of cure is the same throughout the Bankruptcy Code.”); In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 26 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (“‘[C]uring a default’ in Chapter 11 means the same thing as it does in Chapters 7 or 13 . . . .”). 
 37 The Second Circuit defines “default” as “an event in the debtor-creditor relationship which triggers 
certain consequences . . .”). In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26 (2d Cir. 1982); see also In re Entz-White Lumber & 
Supply, 850 F.2d at 1340 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting In re Taddeo’s definition of “default”). 
 38 In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26. 
 39 In re Metz, 820 F.2d at 1497.  
 40 In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, 850 F.2d at 1340 n.1. 
 41 738 F.2d at 872 (“[‘Cure’] refers to [] the restoration of the way things were before the default. Thus, 
the plain meaning of cure . . . is to remedy or rectify the default and restore matters to the status quo ante.”). 
 42 In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 420 (7th Cir. 1984). The Seventh Circuit’s decision in In 
re Madison includes a robust and thorough discussion of the legislative history of § 1124(2). 
A claim or interest is unimpaired by curing the effect of a default and reinstating the original 
terms of an obligation when maturity was brought on or accelerated by the default. The 
intervention of bankruptcy and the defaults represent a temporary crisis which the plan of 
reorganization is intended to clear away. 
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The distinction between pre-default and prebankruptcy status is important 
for the purposes of determining default-rate interest. Indeed, returning the 
debtor to a pre-default position completely eliminates the default-rate interest. 
Prebankruptcy status does not afford such a luxury, however, and the default 
rate would remain intact and due if the debtor defaulted. 
A prominent definition of “cure,” fashioned by appellate courts before the 
Act, concluded that cure required returning the parties to their positions prior 
to default.43 The Fifth Circuit failed to adopt such a definition. Instead, the 
Fifth Circuit refused to refer to § 1124 in framing cure’s definition and held 
that it was “entirely sensible to interpret ‘reinstatement’ as returning the parties 
to their pre-bankruptcy rather than their pre-default status.”44 The court 
disagreed with the debtor’s argument that cure’s meaning for the purposes of 
§ 1124 developed by common law jurisprudence could help inform the 
understanding of “cure” for the purposes of § 1123 (the statute proscribing 
requirements for the plan).45 Instead, the court concluded that “no part of the 
Code compels the inference of cure” from § 1124, the section describing what 
constitutes an unimpaired plan.46 Although the Fifth Circuit’s decision came 
down after the Act, the Act did not retroactively apply to agreements and loans 
entered into before its implementation.47 
4. Prohibition Against Collecting Both Late Fees and Default-Rate Interest 
As one court explained, default interest rates are used 
[A]s a means to compensate a lender for the administrative expenses 
and inconvenience in monitoring untimely payments. Because the 
costs incurred in performing this task will vary from case to case, the 
increased interest rate is a compromise by the lender and the 
                                                                                                                 
Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 
5906). 
 43 See In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, 850 F.2d at 1342 (“[T]he power to cure under the Bankruptcy 
Code authorizes a plan to nullify all consequences of default, including avoidance of default penalties such as 
higher interest); In re Metz, 820 F.2d at 1497 (holding that the cure provisions of chapter 13 allow “the debtor 
to ‘cure’ (i.e., pay or bring current) arrearages on the debt and thereby reinstate the debt”); In re Clark, 738 
F.2d at 872 (“[W]hat the term [“cure”] refers to is the restoration of the way things were before the default.”). 
 44 In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d 1054, 1059 (5th Cir. 1998).  
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. The court further and concluded that because the Banks’ claims were unimpaired, § 1124 was 
inapplicable and the definition of “cure” was not “fungible.” Id. 
 47 Id. at 1059 n.6.  
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borrower in recognition of the fact that attempting to quantify the 
exact dollar amount of the lender’s injury would be impractical.48 
In thinking about disputes over interest and interest rates in chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceedings, it helps to separate “interest” into three distinct 
categories: (1) “prepetition interest,” which accrued prior to the filing of a 
chapter 11 petition; (2) “pendency interest,” which accrues between the 
petition date and the effective date of the debtor’s reorganization plan; and (3) 
“plan interest,” which will accrue as of the effective date of the plan.49 While 
the three aforementioned types of interest are generally agreed upon, one 
commentator has argued that the Act created a fourth type: “arrearage interest” 
(i.e., compound interest).50 The three agreed-upon temporal categories of 
interest are characterized by unique restrictions under the Code.51 For example, 
the Code prevents oversecured creditors52 from receiving both default-rate 
interest and late charges.53  
A separate argument has arisen regarding post-petition interest.54 This 
Comment, however, concerns only default-rate (arrearage) interest. 
Specifically, this Comment addresses interest rates that increase as a direct 
result of a debtor’s default, irrespective of how the default occurs. This 
Comment will argue that default-rate interest, despite now-uniform decisions 
from circuits to the contrary, should not be required to cure a claim.  
                                                 
 48 In re Vest Assocs., 217 B.R. 696, 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing In re Terry, L.P., 27 F.3d 241, 
244, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 948 (1994)). 
 49 Pawlowic, supra note 1, at 151; see ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS 
AND CREDITORS 461–66 (2d ed. 1991). 
 50 Pawlowic, supra note 1, at 151–52, 178–82. Professor Pawlowic notes how § 305 of the Act “simply 
creates a separate rule for determining the amount necessary to cure a default and divorces that rule from the 
ordinary rules for determining prepetition, pendency, and plan interest.” Id. at 179. 
 51 See generally id. at 151–52 (stating (1) prepetition is allowable to the extent and at the rate allowed by 
state law, (2) pendency interest is generally not allowed except to the extent established by traditional and 
long-existing exceptions for a solvent debtor; and (3) plan interest is “provided for under the reorganization 
chapters of the Code at the current market rate”). 
 52 A creditor is oversecured when the value of collateral exceeds the amounts of the creditor’s allowed 
secured claim. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, ¶ 506.03; Evan D. Flaschen, Adequate 
Protection for Oversecured Creditors, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 343 (1987). 
 53 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 512 B.R. 296, 315 (S.D. Fla. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and 
remanded sub nom. JPMCC 2006-LDP7 Miami Beach Lodging, LLC v. Sagamore Partners, Ltd. (In re 
Sagamore Partners, Ltd.), 610 F. App’x 922 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing In re Vest Assoc., 217 B.R. at 701). 
Allowing a creditor to collect both default-rate interest and late charges from the debtor would be inequitable 
and unreasonable within the meaning of § 506(b). 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2012). In re 1095 Commonwealth Ave. 
Corp., 204 B.R. 284, 305 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997). 
 54 See generally Carlson, supra note 13, at 618 (stating a question exists as to whether oversecured 
creditors are entitled to receive higher postdefault interest rates per the agreement). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This section will proceed in three parts. First, it will identify cases decided 
prior to the Act’s implementation, which helped inform the “cure” 
jurisprudence before Congress’s amendments. Second, this section will explore 
the impetus and congressional intent of the Act’s amendment of § 1123(d). 
Third, this section will evaluate several illuminating cases decided after the 
Act’s passage. JPMCC 2006-LDP7 Miami Beach Lodging, LLC v. Sagamore 
Partners, Ltd. (In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd.) provides a useful summary of 
the diverging views on whether “cure” includes default-rate interest.55 To 
understand the problem, a brief summary of the pertinent facts of In re 
Sagamore Partners, Ltd. is instructive. 
A. JPMCC 2006-LDP7 Miami Beach Lodging, LLC v. Sagamore Partners, 
Ltd. 
Sagamore Partners owned Sagamore Hotel.56 Martin Taplin wholly held 
and controlled 100% of Sagamore Partners when Sagamore Partners filed for 
chapter 11 bankruptcy relief.57 In 2006, Sagamore Partners executed a $31.5 
million loan from Arbor Commercial Mortgage, LLC for the “luxurious” hotel, 
secured by a mortgage on the property.58 Arbor Commercial Mortgage then 
assigned the loan to JPMCC.59 The loan agreement set interest at 6.54%, with 
Sagamore to make interest-only payments each month.60 Upon maturity (April 
11, 2016), the base loan and all amounts remaining would become payable to 
the creditor.61 However, in “any Event of Default”62 interest increased to 
11.54%.63 Additionally, the agreement provided that Sagamore Partners would 
be responsible for late fees in the event of default; later, all parties agreed that 
the late fee provisions were impermissible under applicable law.64 In August 
                                                 
 55 610 F. App’x 922 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 56 Id. at 925. 
 57 Id. 
 58 SAGAMORE, http://www.sagamorehotel.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2015); In re Sagamore Partners, 
Ltd., 512 B.R. 296, 301 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
 59 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 610 F. App’x at 925. 
 60 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 512 B.R. at 301. 
 61 Id. 
 62 The loan agreement stipulated that a default would occur when “any regularly scheduled payment with 
respect to any portion of the Debt when due.” In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 610 F. App’x at 924. 
 63 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 512 B.R. at 301. 
 64 Id. at 318. 
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2009, Sagamore Partners did not make its monthly payment and failed to make 
every payment thereafter.65 
After filing for bankruptcy, but before JPMCC commenced foreclosure 
proceedings, Sagamore Partners filed a reorganization plan in which it 
proposed to cure the loan held by JPMCC by paying all amounts due and 
rendering the loan unimpaired.66 Originally, JPMCC chose to charge late fees, 
which totaled approximately $250,000.67 In fact, Sagamore Partners had 
already paid late fees assessed by JPMCC.68 As a result, the bankruptcy court 
concluded JPMCC’s choice of late fees precluded it from later electing to 
charge default-rate interest,69 as creditors “may receive payment of either 
default interest or late charges, but not both.”70 The district court affirmed the 
ruling. 
The Eleventh Circuit overruled both courts with regard to the discrepancy 
between late fees and default interest, surmising that: (1) JPMCC demanded 
both late fees and default-rate interest; (2) JPMCC only accepted late fees 
under protest; and (3) receiving payment under protest does not constitute a 
waiver.71 The parties disagreed about whether the debtor had to pay the 
default-rate interest, totaling $5,416,250.72 The debtor argued that payment of 
default-rate interest was not required to satisfy the requirement of § 1124(2), 
which the debtor claimed served as the authority to avoid default-rate 
interest.73 The creditor demanded interest at the default rate of 11.54% and 
insisted its claim was not “cured” unless the default interest was paid. The 
creditor took exception to the debtor’s theory that § 1124(2) granted the 
authority to cure and, instead, contended that such a cure “must comply with 
[§] 1123(d) of the” Code.74 
The bankruptcy judge agreed with the creditor; the court held that the 
debtor must pay all amounts due, including default-rate interest, to cure its 
default on the loan.75 Later, for reasons other than statutory interpretation 
                                                 
 65 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 610 F. App’x at 925. 
 66 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 512 B.R. at 302. 
 67 Id. at 315. 
 68 Id. at 318. 
 69 Id. at 315. 
 70 Id. 
 71 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 610 F. App’x 922, 926–29 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 72 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 512 B.R. at 302. 
 73 In re Sagamore Partners, LTD, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3224, at *10 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 10, 2012). 
 74 Id. 
 75 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 512 B.R. at 302. 
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based on the definition of a “cure,” the bankruptcy court held JPMCC was not 
entitled to default-rate interest. Sagamore Partners appealed. 
On appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, Sagamore Partners’ argument relied 
heavily on pre-1994 court rulings and musings about the legislative intent of 
§ 1123(d). JPMCC (and the Eleventh Circuit’s holding) largely based its 
argument on the plain language of the statute. The court’s stance on the 
implications of § 1123(d) began and ended with one consideration: plain 
language.76 By limiting its analysis to only the language, the court deprives us 
of any analysis of the Act’s impetus, the implications Congress pondered, and 
the practical results of a ruling potentially at odds with congressional intent. 
The panel recognized, however, that this issue was a point of contention across 
the circuit courts, citing a Ninth Circuit case as evidence that the issue was far 
from settled.77 
After concluding the “straightforward statutory command”78 demanded 
payment of default-rate interest for the purposes of § 1123(d), the court held 
the default-rate interest complied with existing Florida law and reversed the 
denial of default-rate interest.79 In full, the court held: 
[I]n 1994, Congress enacted amendments to the Bankruptcy Code 
that, among other things, provided the previously missing definition 
of “cure.” See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d). In pertinent part, § 1123(d) states 
that, “[n]otwithstanding subsection (a) of this section . . . if it is 
proposed in a plan to cure a default the amount necessary to cure the 
default shall be determined in accordance with the underlying 
agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law.” Given this 
“straightforward statutory command” in § 1123(d), “there is no 
reason to resort to legislative history.” United States v. Gonzales, 520 
U.S. 1, 6, 117 S. Ct. 1032, 137 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1997). Therefore, we 
read the current iteration of the Bankruptcy Code to require a debtor 
to cure its default in accordance with the underlying contract or 
agreement, so long as that document complies with relevant 
nonbankruptcy law. See In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d 1054, 1059 
n.6 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Congress, in bankruptcy amendments enacted in 
1994, arguably rejected the Entz-White denial of contractual default 
interest rates”); but see Sylmar, 314 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) 
                                                 
 76 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd.), 610 F. App’x at 927 (citing U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997)).  
 77 JPMCC 2006-LDP7 Miami Beach Lodging, LLC v. Sagamore Partners, Ltd. (In re Sagamore Partners, 
Ltd.), 620 F. App’x 864, 869 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Platinum Capital, Inc. v. Sylmar Plaza, L.P. (In re 
Sylmar Plaza, L.P.), 314 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 78 Id. (quoting U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997)). 
 79 Id. at 872. 
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(holding that, with respect to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3), Entz-White 
remains good law).80 
B. Pacifica L 51 LLC v. New Investments, Inc. 
Although In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc. retained strong prece-
dential value in the Ninth Circuit at the time the Eleventh Circuit decided In re 
Sagamore Partners, Ltd., it no longer remains “good law.”81 The Ninth Circuit 
revisited In re Entz-White and ultimately rejected the prior panel’s holding in 
Pacifica L 51 LLC v. New Investments Inc. (In re New Investments, Inc.).82 In 
In re New Investments, the note called for an 8% interest rate.83 If the debtor 
defaulted, the interest rate rose to 13%.84  
While the court noted its decision in In re Entz-White, it ultimately rejected 
the prior panel’s holding because the plain language “compel[led]” it.85 This 
decision was reached despite the fact that In re Entz-White was decided after 
the Act’s implementation.86  
The Ninth Circuit provided additional justification beyond mere plain lan-
guage. Judge Mary Murguia, writing for the majority, went on to conclude that 
“legislative history would not help” the debtor.87 It matters not, the majority 
reasoned, that Congress intended to overturn Rake and not speak to this partic-
ular issue.88 The panel split two-to-one, and Judge Berzon authored a forceful 
dissent, stating that neither the statute’s text nor its legislative history justified 
the majority’s decision.89 She began by stating Congress had not displaced In 
re Entz-White by passing the Act.90 The Ninth Circuit in In re Entz-White de-
termined curing a default meant “nullify[ing] all consequences of the de-
fault.”91 And because § 1123(d)’s text did not provide “guidance on which of 
the note’s provisions govern[ed],” In re Entz-White should continue to do so.92  
                                                 
 80 Id. at 869. 
 81 JPMCC 2006-LDP7 Miami Beach Lodging, LLC v. Sagamore Partners, Ltd. (In re Sagamore Partners, 
Ltd.), 620 F. App’x 864, 869 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 82 840 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 83 Id. at 1139. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 1141. 
 86 Id. at 1145.  
 87 Id. at 1141. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 1143. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. (quoting In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc., 850 F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 92 Id. at 1144. 
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C. Notable Cases Prior to the Act 
Courts were originally free to construe and craft their own definitions of 
“cure.”93 In addition to relying upon sister circuits’ chapter 11 definition of 
“cure,” bankruptcy, district, and circuit courts often borrowed from the 
definition of “cure” developed in the chapter 13 context. The following cases 
exemplify how the definition of “cure” evolved through case law, particularly 
highlighting cases in various circuits that explore whether default-rate interest 
is a requirement to “cure” a default.  
1. In re Taddeo 
A Second Circuit case, In re Taddeo,94 is a hallmark decision from which 
other circuits borrowed the definition of cure.95 In re Taddeo concerned a 
chapter 13 case in which the debtors defaulted upon their mortgage. As a 
result, the creditor did three things: (1) accelerated the mortgage; (2) demanded 
full balance of the mortgage; and (3) initiated foreclosure proceedings.96 The 
debtors sought refuge under chapter 13 and proposed to cure the default.97 
The debtors’ proposal required debtors to pay the mortgage in arrears in 
monthly installments of $100, but it did not include a provision calling for the 
debtors to accelerate the plan.98 As a result, the creditor objected to the plan 
and petitioned the court for relief from the automatic stay to foreclose upon the 
residence.99 The creditor submitted a claim for $14,148.18, the total amount of 
the accelerated mortgage.100 The question answered by the Second Circuit was 
“can [the debtor] pay arrearages to [the creditor] and thereby cure the default 
and reinstate the mortgage” or, alternatively, must the mortgage be 
accelerated?101 The court held the former, and ruled in favor of the debtor. 
                                                 
 93 See In re Liberty Warehouse Associates Ltd. P’ship, 220 B.R. 546, 548 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“The 
Bankruptcy Code does not define ‘cure.’”). 
 94 685 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 95 See In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, 850 F.2d at 1340 (stating the Second Circuit’s understanding 
of what “curing a default” means); In re Udhus, 218 B.R. 513, 515 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (stating the Ninth 
Circuit has adopted the Second Circuit’s definition of cure as its In re Taddeo decision). 
 96 In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 25. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 26. 
 99 Id. at 25. 
 100 In re Taddeo, 9 B.R. 299, 301 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 15 B.R. 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 685 F.2d 
24 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 101 In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 25 (“[T]he question of whether under the plan the Taddeos can pay 
arrearages to [the creditor] and thereby cure the default and reinstate the mortgage is squarely presented for 
decision.”). 
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The bankruptcy court began its analysis by “dispel[ling] the myth that once 
a mortgage has been accelerated a federal bankruptcy court can never undo the 
acceleration.”102 Relying upon § 1124, the court “analogiz[ed]” a cure under 
chapter 13 to one under § 1124, which allowed a debtor to de-accelerate the 
mortgage and resume regular payments.103 The Second Circuit concluded that 
the power to cure necessarily included the power to de-accelerate.104 
2. In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc. 
The Ninth Circuit decided In re Entz-White105 before the passage of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, and until In re New Investments, In re Entz-
White was the case to which many courts within the circuit adhered.106 In this 
case, the debtor borrowed $4,170,175 on a promissory note, with interest set at 
1.5%.107 Pursuant to the promissory note, should the debtor fail to repay the 
loan, an 18% interest rate would apply (equaling an additional $190,617).108 
The creditor, Great Western, however, disagreed and insisted that it was 
entitled to receive post-default interest at the default rate of 18%.109  
On appeal, the creditor argued that because the debtor had defaulted before 
filing for relief (as the debtor did in In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd.), payment 
of interest at the default rate was required before the debtor’s default could be 
“cured.”110 The creditor also asserted that “cure” should be limited to “defaults 
that result in acceleration.”111 
The Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled in favor of the creditor, upholding both 
the bankruptcy and district courts.112 “By curing the default,” the court stated, 
“[the debtor] is entitled to avoid all consequences of the default—including 
higher post-default interest rates.”113 Finally, the court concluded: “[I]t is clear 
                                                 
 102 In re Taddeo, 9 B.R. at 302. 
 103 In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26. 
 104 Id. at 28. 
 105 850 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 106 In re New Invs., Inc., 840 F.3d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding In re Entz-White’s rule permitting 
cure of debt sans post-default interest rate is no longer acceptable pursuant to § 1123(d)); see In re Phx. Bus. 
Park Ltd. Pshp., 257 B.R. 517, 519 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001) (“The Ninth Circuit has uniformly followed the 
Entz-White interpretation of “cure” since 1988 and it remains the law of the circuit today.”). 
 107 In re Entz-White, 850 F.2d at 1339. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 1340–41. 
 111 Id. at 1341. 
 112 Id. at 1340. 
 113 Id. at 1342. 
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that the power to cure under the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a plan to nullify 
all consequences of default . . . .”114 
3. Southland Corp. v. Toronto Dominion (In re Southland Corp.) 
A circuit split over whether post-default interest is required to “cure” a 
creditor almost arose in a case in which the Act was inapplicable.115 In 
Southland Corp v. Toronto Dominion (In re Southland Corp.), a case to which 
the Act did not apply, the underlying agreement called for a 2% increase in the 
event of default.116 The district court and bankruptcy court determined that, to 
cure its default, the debtor was required to pay interest at the default rate 
during the period beginning on the date that the debtor defaulted and 
continuing until the effective date of the debtor’s reorganization plan. In 
upholding the lower courts’ decisions, the Fifth Circuit not only took an 
opinion opposite of the Ninth Circuit; it accused the Ninth Circuit of 
“misread[ing]”117 In re Entz-White (the Ninth Circuit’s own precedent) and 
producing opinions that were “poorly-reasoned.”118 
In re Southland differed from In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., however, in 
that it concerned an impaired class of creditors who voted in favor of a 
debtor’s reorganization plan.119After the bankruptcy court confirmed the 
plan,120 the oversecured creditors filed a proof of claim that did not specifically 
mention default-rate interest.121 Thus, any outcome of the case provides only 
persuasive authority, and, at best, authority that is antiquated and outdated 
given that the Fifth Circuit ostensibly was not permitted to take into 
consideration the amendment of the Act because the parties’ agreement 
predated the Act.  
4. Rake v. Wade 
In Rake v. Wade, the Supreme Court considered whether a chapter 13 
debtor had to pay post-petition interest on arrearages to cure a default on an 
                                                 
 114 Id. 
 115 See In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d 1054, 1059 n.6 (5th Cir. 1998).  
 116 Id. at 1056. 
 117 Id. at 1058 n.5.  
 118 Id. at 1058. 
 119 Id. at 1057. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
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oversecured home.122 The debtors defaulted on a note that allowed for a $5 
charge for each payment missed, but the note was silent as to interest on 
arrearages.123 Before the debtor’s plan was confirmed, the oversecured creditor 
objected to the debtor’s proposal to make all future payments and cure the 
default by paying the arrearages without interest. The creditor asserted that 
§ 506(b) entitled it to interest, but the bankruptcy and district courts disagreed 
and overruled the creditor’s objection. The court of appeals reversed, however, 
and held that the creditor was entitled to post-petition interest on the arrearages 
“even if the mortgage instruments are silent on the subject and state law would 
not require interest to be paid.”124 Essentially, the Court held the Code required 
such interest despite the fact that “state law and the underlying agreement did 
not . . . .”125 
The Court held that the oversecured creditor was entitled to interest, even 
though the contract only specified a $5 rate.126 Congress took exception to 
Justice Thomas’s ten-page opinion and responded accordingly. The Court, in 
Congress’s estimation, contravened the contract and provided a “windfall” to 
the creditors at “the expense of unsecured creditors by forcing debtors to pay 
the bulk of their income to satisfy the secured creditors’ claims.”127 As part of 
the Act, Congress attempted to rectify the decision by including an amendment 
in a large package of amendments. 
C. Impetus of the 1994 Amendment 
As the House Report noted, § 1123(d) was meant to “overrul[e] the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Rake v. Wade.”128 Although Rake concerned 
a mortgagor under a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, Congress designed the 
amendment to prevent a windfall to creditors.129 The purpose of the amendment 
was to “limit the secured creditor to the benefit of the initial bargain.”130 The 
committee did not stop there. The report continued with a final note to create a 
                                                 
 122 508 U.S. 464, 466–67 (1993). 
 123 Id. at 467. 
 124 Wade v. Hannon, 968 F.2d 1036, 1042 (10th Cir. 1992), aff’d sub nom. Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 
(1993). 
 125 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 512 B.R. 296, 308 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (citation omitted).  
 126 Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. at 467. 
 127 H.R. Rep. 103-835, 55, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3364. 
 128 Id. 
 129 In re Phx. Bus. Park Ltd. P’shp., 257 B.R. 517, 521 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001). 
 130 H.R. ReP. 103-835, 55, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3364 (emphasis added). 
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definition of “cure” to put the debtor in the same position “as if the default had 
never occurred.”131 
Many courts that interpret “cure” as not requiring the payment of default-
rate interest base their argument on the language in the House Report.132 
According to the House Report, if the default “had never occurred,” default-
rate interest would be inapplicable.133 The report noted: 
This section will have the effect of overruling the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Rake v. Wade, 113 S.Ct. 2187 (1993). In that case, 
the Court held that the Bankruptcy Code required that interest be paid 
on mortgage arrearages paid by debtors curing defaults on their 
mortgages. Notwithstanding State law, this case has had the effect of 
providing a windfall to secured creditors at the expense of unsecured 
creditors by forcing debtors to pay the bulk of their income to satisfy 
the secured creditors’ claims. This had the effect of giving secured 
creditors interest on interest payments, and interest on the late 
charges and other fees, even where applicable laws prohibits such 
interest and even when it was something that was not contemplated 
by either party in the original transaction. . . . It will limit the secured 
creditor to the benefit of the initial bargain with no court contrived 
windfall. It is the Committee’s intention that a cure pursuant to a plan 
should operate to put the debtor in the same position as if the default 
had never occurred.134 
The Rake decision meant creditors could charge interest not called for in the 
initial contract agreed upon by the parties. 
D. Courts’ Reactions 
In the aftermath of the 1994 amendment, courts understandably grappled 
with how to apply the new amendment to their interpretation of what 
constitutes a “cure” of default in the context of bankruptcies in which default-
rate interest existed.135 Lower courts in the Ninth Circuit largely continued to 
                                                 
 131 Id. 
 132 In re Phx. Bus. Park Ltd. Pshp., 257 B.R. 517, 518 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001). 
 133 H.R. Rep. 103-835, 55, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3364. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Compare CityBank v. Udhus (In re Udhus), 218 B.R. 513, 518 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
cure should return the status of the parties to the same position in existence prior to the default and creditor 
received full payment by being pay at non-default rate), and In re Zamani, 390 B.R. 680, 686 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 2008) (explaining no Ninth Circuit case suggested § 1123(d) “legislatively over[ruled]” Entz-White), with 
In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d 1054, 1059 n.6 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that Congress’s “amendments enacted 
in 1994 [] rejected Entz-White . . . .”). See also In re Vest Assocs., 217 B.R. 696, 702 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
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uphold In re Entz-White, while those within other circuits abandoned precedent 
defining “cure” and began interpreting cure according to the plain language of 
the new statute.136 
Although § 1123(d) was enacted after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re 
Entz-White, the Ninth Circuit continued to cite, rely on, and affirm In re Entz-
White until its decision in In re New Investments.137 In 2002, the Ninth Circuit 
held that In re Entz-White “lays to rest” any argument that a plan, which 
proposes to nullify the effects of a default, does not satisfy the Code’s 
requirements.138 The explicit reference, without any caveat, offered at least 
circumstantial evidence that the Ninth Circuit still considers In re Entz-White 
to be good law.139 With In re New Investments, that is no longer the case.  
In In re Udhus, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel had even 
more explicitly adhered to In re Entz-White after the Act’s passage.140 In In re 
Udhus, a case decided in 1998, the court stated: “Under Entz-White, a § 1123 
cure corrects all defaults and prohibits an award of default interest.”141 Thus, 
even if the Ninth Circuit’s statement about the continued effect of In re Entz-
White in In re Sylmar Plaza is dicta, that decision, coupled with the court’s 
reliance on In re Entz-White in In re Udhus, strongly suggested that In re Entz-
White remained binding precedent in the Ninth Circuit. But the court’s 
decision in In re New Investments imperils the line of reasoning followed after 
In re Entz-White. 
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s precedent pre-In re New 
Investments more closely resembled both Congress’s intent in passing the Act 
and the overarching goals of chapter 11.142 The following cases illustrate the 
                                                                                                                 
(“[T]here is an absence of uniformity in the treatment of default interest provisions.”) (citing In re White, 88 
B.R. 498, 510 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988)). 
 136 In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d at 1058 (calling other cases “poorly reasoned”). It is important to note 
that the Fifth Circuit, in In re Southland Corp., held the 1994 amendment were inapplicable because the 
original petition was filed in 1990. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-394, October 22, 1994, 
108 Stat 4106. 
 137 In re Sylmar Plaza, L.P., 314 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 138 Id. 
 139 See id. In fact, even the creditor in In re Sylmar acknowledged that a “debtor [may] use the provisions 
of 11 U.S.C. §1124(2) to cure and reinstate a defaulted obligation as part of the ‘restructuring of a financially 
troubled entity.’ Southeast, Entz-White and Udhus are quite clear on this point.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6, 
Platinum Capital, Inc. v. Sylmar Plaza, L.P. (In re Sylmar Plaza, L.P.), 314 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 00 
57210), 2001 WL 34091267, at *6 (internal quotation omitted).  
 140 See In re Udhus, 218 B.R. 513 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). 
 141 Id. at 516. 
 142 STRICKLAND & DRAKE JR., supra note 8, § 12:1. 
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different approaches courts have taken following the Act’s passage. The cases, 
taken together, portray how lower courts (i.e., non-appellate courts) grappled 
with the Act.  
1. In re Sylmar Plaza, L.P. 
In In re Sylmar Plaza, L.P., the debtor’s reorganization plan proposed to 
cure its default and, consequently, render the creditor unimpaired.143 The 
creditor objected to the confirmation, however, positing that the plan—which 
did not include $1 million in default-rate interest—was not proposed in good 
faith pursuant to § 1129(a)(3).144 The creditor based its claim on two main 
arguments: (1) the entire plan was a “sham” contrived to obviate the debtor’s 
responsibility to pay default-rate interest; and (2) the plan’s intent to pay 
unsecured classes interest at a rate 1.13% higher than the interest it paid to 
secured classes amounted to unfair discrimination.145 
At base, a plan is proposed in good faith when it is consistent with the 
“objective and purposes of the [] Code.”146 The creditor in In re Sylmar Plaza 
first argued that the debtor failed to act in good faith by proposing to not pay 
interest at the default rate.147 The court rejected the creditor’s argument, 
explaining that it was “[laid] to rest” by In re Entz-White.148 The court quoted 
the holding of In re Entz-White in determining that, because of the “power to 
cure” under the Code, a chapter 11 plan may allow a debtor to avoid all 
consequences of its default, “including . . . default penalties such as higher 
interest.” 149 The court concluded by stating: “Given the specific power to cure 
default, it makes no sense to treat a plan invoking that power as lacking good 
faith.”150 The court’s decision, eight years after the Act’s passage, provided 
strong evidence that the Ninth Circuit continued to consider the In re Entz-
White holding good law—until In re New Investments. 
                                                 
 143 314 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 1074. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 1075.  
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
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2. General Electric Capital Corp. v. Future Media Products 
The rule in In re Entz-White, however, has not been applied without 
question—even within the Ninth Circuit. One Ninth Circuit case that portended 
the end of In re Entz-White is GE Capital Corp. v. Future Media Products.151 
In GE Capital Corp., the Ninth Circuit limited In re Entz-White, holding In re 
Entz-White does not apply to plans made under § 363.152 Because GE involved 
asset sales outside of a chapter 11 plan, the general In re Entz-White rule 
holding that an oversecured creditor was not entitled to interest at the default 
rate did not apply.153 The parties entered into a $10.5 million loan with a non-
default interest rate of 1.5% per annum and a default interest rate of 2%.154 
Lower courts applied In re Entz-White, adopting its holding that to cure 
means to return the debtor to pre-default status. In GE Capital Corp., the 
creditor’s claim was paid in full by asset sales outside of a chapter 11 
bankruptcy plan.155 Because the asset sales transpired outside of the chapter 11 
plan, the Ninth Circuit reasoned In re Entz-White did not apply and the court 
curtailed the extent to which certain plans would be subject to the In re Enzt-
White rule disallowing default-rate interest.156 
3. In re Phoenix Business Park Limited Partnership 
In In re Phoenix Business Park Limited P’ship, the Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Arizona heavily relied on the legislative history of § 1123(d) to 
hold that a debtor is not required to pay default-rate interest to “cure” its 
default.157 In this case, a note specified a 10.75% interest rate and provided that 
the rate would increase to 24% in the event of default.158 The debtor’s proposal 
to cure the default and reorganize did not require the debtor to pay interest on 
the note at the specified default rate.159 The creditor argued that the language 
                                                 
 151 536 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 152 Id. at 973. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id.  
 155 Id. at 971. The Ninth Circuit also further explained how it considers what a creditor is due, stating “the 
default rate should be enforced, subject only to the substantive law governing the loan agreement, unless a 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code provides otherwise.” Id. 
 156 Id. at 973. 
 157 257 B.R. 517, 521–22 (Bankr. D. Ariz 2001). 
 158 Id. at 518. 
 159 Id. 
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of § 1123(d) unambiguously required payment of default-rate interest as part of 
a § 1124(2) cure.160 
The court rejected the creditor’s argument and ultimately held: “Entz-White 
remains good law in the Ninth Circuit and that a debtor needs to pay interest 
only at the contract rate, not at the default rate, and need not pay late charges in 
order to effectuate a cure under section 1124(2).”161 The court’s opinion turned 
primarily on § 365(b) and its analysis of the congressional intent underlying 
§ 1124(2). Congress amended § 365(b)(2)(D) at the same time it amended 
§ 1123(d). Section 365(b)(2)(D), as amended in 1994, provides: 
Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that is a 
breach of a provision relating to . . . (D) the satisfaction of any 
penalty rate or [the satisfaction of any penalty ] provision relating to a 
default arising from any failure of the Debtor to perform 
nonmonetary obligations under an executory contract of unexpired 
lease. 
The court determined that a claim is unimpaired if the “default interest rate is a 
‘penalty rate[]’” despite no default interest being paid.162 The court had “little 
difficulty” determining that the 13% increase in the interest rate in the event of 
default constituted a penalty rate.163 
Congress’s intent proved compelling—even outcome determinative. First, 
the court determined Congress’s intent was “directly contrary” to a holding 
that default-rate interest is required to cure a default.164 The court examined a 
House Report that explained that § 1123(d) was designed to prevent a windfall 
to creditors.165 The inclusion of § 365(b)(2)(D) and its incorporation into 
§ 1124(2)(A) also bolstered the notion that congressional intent favored the 
debtor.166  
Second, the court alluded to the fact that § 1123(d) was enacted in § 305 of 
Title III (Consumer Bankruptcy Issue), the title of which is “Interest on 
Interest,” as opposed to Title II of the Act that addresses commercial 
bankruptcy.167 The exact language of § 1123(d), as amended, is also included 
                                                 
 160 Id. at 520. 
 161 Id. at 522. 
 162 Id. at 521. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. (citation omitted). 
 165 Id. at 521–22. 
 166 Id. at 521. 
 167 Id. at 521–22. 
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in chapters 12 and 13 of the Code. The duplication suggests that consumer 
bankruptcies were Congress’s primary focus in amending § 1123.168 
Finally, the court noted the conspicuous absence of any reference to 
§ 1124(A) in the Act.169 Though Congress did include several other references 
to statutes throughout the Code, it did not explicitly reference § 1124. The 
court relied on this absence an indication that § 1123(d) does not “legislatively 
overrule” In re Entz-White, as the creditor in that case suggested.170 
4. In re Zamani 
A clear contrast from both In re Southland Corp. and In re Sagamore 
Partners is In re Zamani.171 The creditor in In re Zamani took out several 
secured loans, all of which called for an increase of either 5% or 5.75% interest 
added to the note rate should Zamini default.172 After the debtor defaulted and 
subsequently became current on his loan payments several times, the 
individual debtor filed for chapter 11 relief.173 Because the debt was 
oversecured, the creditor was entitled to receive interest on its claims. The 
creditor argued that such interest should be calculated at the default rate 
(5.75% plus the pre-default interest rate—a total difference of $297,000).174 
The debtor’s proposed reorganization plan did not require interest payments at 
the higher default rate.175 
The opinion posited three main arguments. First, the court concluded that 
§ 1123(d) did not overrule the precedent of In re Entz-White.176  
                                                                                                                 
This limited and prescriptive purpose is supported by the fact that the language that became 
section 1123(d) was included as section 305 (entitled "Interest on Interest") in Title III of Reform 
Act—that portion of the statute addressing issues in consumer bankruptcy cases as opposed to 
Title II, the portion of the statute addressing issues in commercial bankruptcy cases. 
Id. 
 168 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 1994 Enacted H.R. 5116, 103 Enacted H.R. 5116, 108 Stat. 4106, 
4134; In re Phx. Bus. Park Ltd., 257 B.R. at 522. 
 169 11 U.S.C. 1123(d) (2012); In re Phx. Bus. Park Ltd., 257 B.R. at 520–22. 
 170 In re Phx. Bus. Park Ltd., 257 B.R. at 522. 
 171 390 B.R. 680 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 172 Id. at 684. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 685. 
 175 Id. at 684. 
 176 Id. at 686. 
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Second, the bankruptcy court acknowledged and appeared to adopt another 
bankruptcy court’s opinion that held the legislative history of § 1123(d) 
compelled a finding that post-default interest is not required for a cure.177 
Third, the court reasoned that because the contract lacked a provision 
specifically addressing the way in which a “cure” should be calculated, no 
contractual provision required use of the higher default rate.178 In other words, 
the court treated the lack of contractual language referencing “cure” as an 
absence of any relevant underlying provision.179  
5. In re Moody Nat. SHS Houston H, LLC 
In In re Moody Nat. SHS Houston H, LLC, the debtor argued that the 
creditor was unimpaired under § 1124(2) because the debtor’s plan cured the 
$14,431,000 note.180 The debtor borrowed $14,431,000 with a contractual 
default interest rate of 5% above the regular interest rate.181 After defaulting, 
the debtor sought to cure the default and reinstate the loan pursuant to a 
reorganization plan.182 The debtor claimed that: (1) § 1124(2) provides 
substantive relief from the requirement to pay default interest, (2) § 365(b)(2) 
provides an exception because the default interest rate is a penalty, and (3) 
legislative history renders § 1123(d) inapplicable in a determination about 
impairment.183 The bankruptcy court disagreed with the debtor on all three 
fronts. 
The court’s opinion relied heavily on dicta from In re Southland Corp.184 
First, the court held that the debtor’s argument provided a “circular” 
                                                 
 177 Id. 
 178 See id. at 687 (stating “[b]ecause there is no contractual provision requiring the use of the higher 
default interest rate for purposes of calculating a cure amount, looking to the underlying contract as directed 
by § 1123(d) does not, in this case, prohibit the debtor's use of the basic contract rate of interest in curing his 
debt”). 
 179 In re Zamani, 390 B.R. 680, 687 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008) (stating “[b]ecause there is no contractual 
provision requiring the use of the higher default interest rate for purposes of calculating a cure amount, look-
ing to the underlying contract as directed by § 1123(d) does not, in this case, prohibit the debtor’s use of the 
basic contract rate of interest in curing his debt”). 
 180 426 B.R. 667, 672 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 181 Id. at 677. 
 182 Id. at 669. 
 183 Id. at 673. 
 184 See id. (quoting In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d 1054, 1059 n.6 (5th Cir. 1998)). Largely conforming 
to Judge Jones’s criticisms of In re Entz-White, the court in In re Moody also criticizes the Entz-White opinion 
for “not giv[ing] proper recognition to the relationships that exist between §§ 1123, 1124, 1126 and 1129 of 
the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. at 672. 
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definition.185 By arguing that § 1124 does not require or mandate payment of 
default-rate interest, the debtor stretched the scope of § 1124 “beyond its plain 
meaning.”186 Second, the court was unable to locate any precedent supporting 
the debtor’s position that § 365(b)(2) exempts a debtor from paying default 
rate interest because of its penalty provision.187 
Moreover, the debtor reasoned that the statute as written was unambiguous 
and thus excluded any consideration of legislative history.188 The court not 
only rejected the debtor’s legislative history argument, it also suggested that 
legislative history cuts against its argument.189 The court provided no evidence 
of legislative history to support its claim that it “hurts” the debtor’s position 
except for the fact that Congress enacted the Act.190 
The disagreement in In re Moody concerns “cure” for the purposes of 
impairment in § 1124(2). Prior to the 1994 amendments, however, courts 
utilized § 1124 as a way to fashion a definition of “cure” under § 1123. What is 
more, the decision in In re Moody appears to suggest the provision added to 
§ 1123(d) by the Act has meaningful implications for the purposes of 
construing § 1124(2)(A). 
                                                 
 185 Id. at 672. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 674–75. 
 188 Id. at 674 (citing Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S., 559 U.S. 229 (2010); Whitfield v. U.S., 
543 U.S. 209, 215–16 (2005)).  
 189 Id.  
The legislative history [of 11 U.S.C. 1123(d)] hurts rather than helps Moody's position. Of 
course, the particular issue before the Supreme Court in Rake concerned home mortgages. But, 
the Congressional repair to Rake solved the issue by a broader declaration—Thou shall look to 
state law when determining cure amounts. Congress did not limit the cure to the narrow problem 
that Rake created. Congress could have simply amended § 1322 of the Bankruptcy Code. Instead, 
Congress determined that all cures (including the one faced by Moody) should be determined in 
accordance with state law and the underlying agreement. 
Id. Research has failed to locate other court’s viewing legislative history similar to the way in which the court 
views it in In re Moody.  
 190 See id. In fact, the portion of the judge’s opinion discussing how legislative history undercuts the 
creditor’s argument is completely void of any reference to committee reports, floor transcript, signing 
statements, etc. The judge bases his somewhat novel but absolutely unique theory on the basis that because 
congress chose to amend the state (i.e., chose to pass the Act) that in and of itself constituted legislative history 
warranting a decision favorable to the creditors. His theory, taken to its logical conclusion, implies the 
presence of the text itself is legislative history. Not only does Judge Isgur criticize the use of legislative 
history, he also astonishingly incorporates textualism into a legislative history analysis. Id. 
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6. In re Sweet 
In re Sweet offers an example from a Tenth Circuit bankruptcy court. 
Debtors borrowed $498,195 from creditors to be repaid with interest at a 
minimum rate of 8.75% and a maximum rate of 16.75%, except that—in the 
event of default—the interest rate would increase to 21%.191 In a post-
confirmation hearing to determine the value of the creditor’s claim, the debtor 
argued that the interest on the outstanding obligations should be calculated at 
the pre-default rate.192 The creditors disagreed and contended that § 1123(d) 
unambiguously required that default-rate interest be paid for the debtor’s 
default to be “cured.”193 The court noted the absence of a provision permitting 
the borrower to cure the default in the parties’ underlying agreement.194 Upon 
examination of applicable Colorado law, the court located no relevant statues 
(i.e., “applicable nonbankruptcy law”) on-point to inform the outcome of the 
case.195 
The court seemed to accept, arguendo, that In re Entz-White remained good 
law; and it engaged in a discussion somewhat similar to the one proffered by 
the court in In re Phoenix, exploring whether the default interest constituted a 
penalty.196 The parties prevented the court from entertaining whether the 
additional 12.25% interest because of default was a penalty because the parties 
stipulated that 21% was reasonable.197 The court, however, ultimately allowed 
default-rate interest to apply, but it left unanswered the question of whether it 
might have ruled differently had the debtor raised the notion of penalty. 
The previous cases offer an instructive guide on the judiciary’s reaction to 
the Act. Each of the five cases discussed above illustrates the considerations 
and differing results courts reached when forced to grapple with how default-
rate interest impacts the consideration of cure. An analysis—considering all 
these cases together—follows.  
                                                 
 191 369 B.R. 644, 647 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007). 
 192 Id. at 648. 
 193 Id. at 649. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 649–50; see 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (2012). 
 196 In re Sweet, 369 B.R. at 650. 
 197 Id. at 650–51. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in In re Sagamore Partners minimizes the 
historical impetus for the Act, thereby thwarting Congress’s efforts and intent. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision acknowledges that Congress did not explicitly 
intend to create this situation but proceeds to disregard Congress’s intention in 
reaching its holding.198 By beginning and concluding with the “plain 
language,” the Eleventh Circuit fails to adequately explore the outcome and 
anticipate the larger implications that this case might have on other debtors. A 
discussion follows about why the Eleventh Circuit’s stringent interpretation of 
the Code is not only less preferable for practical purposes, but also clearly 
contrary to congressional intent. 
This section will argue the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion produces four 
detrimental results: (1) obstructs the overarching goal of chapter 11; (2) 
conflicts with Congress’s intent behind the language; (3) has the potential to 
unnecessarily harm undersecured creditors; and (4) creates an inconsonant 
definition of the same word within the same chapter, denying courts the ability 
to treat “cure” in §§ 1123 and 1124 interchangeably, arguably creating two 
different definitions of the same word. 
A. Ninth Circuit Precedent Is Preferable to the Recent Eleventh Circuit Case 
1. The Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion Obstructs the Primary Goal of Chapter 
11  
The Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation—mandating default-rate interest in 
order to cure a claim—frustrates the premise and goal of chapter 11: successful 
rehabilitation of the debtor business.199 As in In re Sagamore Partners, default 
interest can oftentimes amount to quite substantial sums.200 In that case, for 
example, a total of $5,416,250.00 had accrued in default interest. By requiring 
default interest, and by applying the holding in this case to other cases in which 
                                                 
 198 In re New Invs., Inc., 840 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The fact that Congress had a particular 
purpose in mind when enacting a statute does not limit the effect of the statute's text . . . .”). 
 199 In re Colortex Indus., 19 F.3d 1371, 1377 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Bussel, supra note 9, at 946 
(“Analysis of random bankruptcy cases indicates that pragmatic interpretive methods continue to be the norm 
in the bankruptcy field.”). 
 200 See, e.g., In re Sylmar Plaza, L.P., 314 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 
512 B.R. 296, 302 (S.D. Fla. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. JPMCC 2006-LDP7 
Miami Beach Lodging, LLC v. Sagamore Partners, Ltd. (In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd.), 620 F. App’x 864 
(11th Cir. 2015). 
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more than one creditor is in a class, the plan of helping a debtor regain its 
footing, become profitable again, and start making payments to creditors could 
be frustrated. If the intent of the Act is to assist businesses in becoming 
profitable again for the mutual sake of both creditors and the public, then 
requiring sometimes exorbitant “interest on interest” frustrates that goal. 
Additionally, few instances likely exist where a debtor filed for bankruptcy 
and did not default on a promise. If the intent of curing a default is to place 
debtors and creditors in positions they would have been in had the default not 
occurred, it would not require using default-rate interest. Thus, the language of 
the Code is superfluous. One might imagine a scenario where a debtor files for 
bankruptcy prior to defaulting, but those scenarios are unlikely, especially 
when the debtor is required to make monthly payments, such as the debtor in 
In re Sagamore Partners.201 
2. Principles of Interpretation in the Bankruptcy Context 
Courts have crafted bankruptcy-specific statutory construction principles. 
One principle holds, “When Congress amend[ed] the bankruptcy law, it d[id] 
not write on a clean slate.”202 Another principle applies when a pre-Code 
practice exists. “Furthermore, th[e] Court has been reluctant to accept 
arguments that would interpret the Code, however vague the particular 
language under consideration might be, to effect a major change in pre-Code 
practice that is not the subject of at least some discussion in the legislative 
history.”203 
Ostensibly, Congress knew of the Second and Ninth Circuits’ 
interpretations of what it means to cure a claim. The Ninth Circuit fashioned its 
definition in 1988, and the Second Circuit did so even earlier in 1982. The 
Fifth Circuit appears to be alone in interpreting “cure” to include default-rate 
interest because it decided the issue after the Act’s passage.204 What is clear is 
that circuits were developing an exceptionally similar and consonant concept 
of cure without congressional interference. Now, after Congress has inserted 
                                                 
 201 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 512 B.R. at 301. 
 202 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992) (quoting Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515, 521 (1943)) 
(quotation marks omitted).  
 203 Id. (citing United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 377 
(1988)). Pre-Code behavior is also used to interpret “gaps in the express coverage of the Code . . . .” Id. at 433 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 204 In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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itself into the debate (perhaps inadvertently), courts have overturned their 
previously established precedents with little discussion of congressional intent. 
Instead of creating the amendment to overrule the circuits’ interpretations, 
Congress sought to overrule an anti-debtor Supreme Court case—Rake.205 Had 
Congress intended to override the jurisprudence of the respective circuits, one 
would understandably expect Congress to at least make reference, even if 
passing, to that intent. In other words, the Act worked as a ceiling (preventing 
unbargained higher rates of interest), not a floor (demanding bargained-for 
interest). Tension exists because courts construct the Act to apply in scenarios 
that Congress did not anticipate or intend.  
One could argue that the Ninth Circuit’s pre-In re New Investments 
interpretation of § 1123(d) and its definition of “cure” are consistent with the 
plain language of § 123(d). If “cure,” as both the Second and Ninth Circuits 
have previously stated, means to return the parties to the position they were in 
before the default, then the contractual obligation of paying debt excluding the 
default rate would be in accordance with any underlying agreement. 
Obviously, in circuits such as the Fifth Circuit, which has tangentially ruled 
that cure places the parties in the positions they were in prebankruptcy, this 
argument cannot pass muster. But, in circuits that have not addressed this 
issue, or in circuits in which “cure” was implied to place the parties in their 
pre-default positions, this argument is both salient and sound. 
The Ninth Circuit’s precedent pre-In re New Investments conforms to 
Congress’s intent. Contrary to the bankruptcy court’s opinion in In re Moody, 
no congressional history remotely suggests Congress intended the Act to make 
default-rate interest (i.e., “interest upon interest”) necessary to effectuate a 
cure. But, to even consider legislative history, the language must be 
unambiguous, something the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits fail to 
acknowledge.206 Even other courts ruling for creditors concede the 
amendments were “not very clear.”207 Perhaps if the courts acknowledged 
ambiguity, a complete and extensive assessment of legislative intent and 
history would shed additional light on this observably divisive subject.  
                                                 
 205 H.R. Rep. 103-835, 55, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3364. 
 206 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419. 
 207 See, e.g., In re 1 Ashbury Ct. Partners, L.L.C., No. 11-10131, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3922, at *17 (U.S. 
Bankr. D. Kan. Oct. 5, 2011); see also In re Sweet, 369 B.R. 644, 650 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007) (concluding In 
re Entz-White was not overruled by § 1123(d) under the circumstances of this case).  
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In fact, the court in In re Moody held that the legislative history of 
§ 1123(d) undercut a debtor’s argument that the Act’s language rings 
hollow.208 The court asserted that by including the exact language in several 
different sections of the Code, Congress intended to impose such a reading as 
the one reached in In re Moody. By the same token, if Congress intended to 
apply the definition of § 1123(d), it could have done so where one might 
expect: in the definition section.209 By enacting the definition of “cure” in 
§ 1123 and not in §§ 1124 or 101, Congress did not remedy the issue of what 
constitutes a cure for the purposes of what is an impaired claim.  
The court went on to state that Congress resolved Rake by a broader 
definition “[t]hou shall look to state law when determining cure amounts.”210 
But Congress’s actual language required courts and parties to look to 
“nonbankruptcy,” not state, law.211 As the court astutely noted in In re Sweet, 
what if the contract fails to mention anything relating to default-rate interest 
for the purposes of a cure?212 Are courts to assume if default-rate interest is 
called for that it should persist into reorganization? That appears to be the 
approach taken by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, but perhaps, as the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado noted, that assumption 
should itself be the question.213 If no provision relates to default-rate interest 
for the purpose of cure, why should courts conclude, even in its absence, that 
such a rate is required? 
As this Comment has shown, default-rate interest regularly accrues to 
exorbitant amounts. Whether it was the $297,000 of unpaid default interest in 
In re Zamini,214 the $1 million (an additional 5% interest) in In re Sylmar 
Plaza,215 or the $5,416,250.00 in In re Sagamore Partners,216 each of these 
amounts demonstrate that the difference between default and non-default-rate 
                                                 
 208 In re Moody Nat’l SHS Houston H, LLC, 426 B.R. 667, 674 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010); see also id. at 
676 n.5.  
 209 See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 210 In re Moody Nat’l SHS Hous. H, LLC, 426 B.R. at 674. 
 211 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d). 
 212 In re Sweet, 369 B.R. 644, 650 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007). 
 213 In re Sweet, 369 B.R. 644 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007). 
 214 390 B.R. 680, 685 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 215 314 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 216 512 B.R. 296, 302 (S.D. Fla. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. JPMCC 2006-
LDP7 Miami Beach Lodging, LLC v. Sagamore Partners, Ltd. (In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd.), 620 F. App’x 
864 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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interest can be significant. For instance, the unpaid default interest in JPMCC 
constitutes approximately 17% of the entire note.217 
3. The Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion Creates Unnecessary Tension 
The Eleventh Circuit in In re Sagamore Partners acknowledged the 
“tension” in the panel’s interpretation created within the Code. “Thus, under 
§ 1124, any outstanding default-rate interest is ignored when determining 
whether a claim to a loan is impaired, but . . . under § 1123, outstanding 
default-rate interest, if called for in the underlying agreement, precludes 
reinstating the original terms of the loan.”218 The disparity allows a 
reorganization plan that does not include default-rate interest to be accepted by 
a creditor while precluding that same plan from reinstatement.219 The Eleventh 
Circuit, in acknowledging the tension, cited to a bankruptcy court case from 
Texas, In re Moody.220 As previously discussed, the Fifth Circuit already held 
the meaning of “cure” is not interchangeable within the Code even before the 
Act’s implementation.221 The Eleventh Circuit accepted the same notion that 
“cure” is not to be read to mean the same in § 1123 as it is in § 1124.222 
However, the case to which the Eleventh Circuit cites, In re Moody, appears to 
apply its analysis of a § 1123 cure the same way it would apply “cure” under 
§ 1124.223 
                                                 
 217 The original loan was $31.5 million dollars. Id. at 301. 
 218 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 620 F. App’x 864, 869 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 219 See id. 
 220 Id. (quoting In re Moody Nat. SHS Houston H, LLC, 426 B.R. 667, 676 n.5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010)). 
 221 See In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d 1054, 1059 (5th Cir. 1998) (“No part of the Code compels the 
inference of cure.”). 
 222 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 620 F. App’x at 869 (quoting In re Moody Nat. SHS Houston H, LLC, 
426 B.R. 667, 676 n.5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010)). 
 223 See In re Moody Nat. SHS Houston H, LLC, 426 B.R. at 676 n.5 (holding both the prepetition cure 
amount and the post-petition cure amounts cannot be read to on a “different basis”). In a footnote, the court 
recognized the tension between a claim-based evaluation of lack of impairment and the 
application of § 1123(d) to post-petition amounts that are required to effect a cure. Among other 
things, this tension demonstrates that the Bankruptcy Code does not precisely equate curing a 
default with unimpairment of a claim. Nevertheless, the Court does not believe that the statute 
can be read to determine pre-petition cure amounts on a different basis than post-petition cure 
amounts. Both must be determined “in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.” 
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (2012)).  
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The creditor in In re Southland attempted to argue “cure” was fungible 
throughout the Code.224 The Eleventh Circuit, in identifying the “tension,” 
added credence to the creditor’s argument.225 Even Justice Scalia, in a 1992 
Supreme Court case in which statutory construction of the Code was at issue, 
railed against what he called a “one-subsection-at-a-time approach to statutory 
exegesis.”226 Because the Eleventh Circuit both acknowledged the “tension”227 
and proceeded to casually dismiss the issue as the “Code not precisely 
equat[ing] curing a default for the purposes of reinstating a loan with 
unimpairment of a claim,”228 courts should look beyond plain language. The 
court’s decision to accept at least some modicum of ambiguity allowed it to 
look beyond the Code and examine the intent of the legislature. Such an 
analysis would, as has been demonstrated, clearly signify Congress did not 
intend to force debtors to pay interest upon interest. 
But the tension need not exist, for if the Eleventh Circuit’s decision stands, 
there may be one understanding of “cure” for § 1123(d) and another 
understanding for the purposes of impairment under § 1124. A party creditor 
may be unimpaired even though the plan does not call for interest at the default 
rate, but the plan might simultaneously contravene § 1123(d). 
Ninth Circuit decisions pre-In re New Investments do not leave such a 
noticeable tension. Instead, the Ninth Circuit interpreted chapter 11 cure in 
pari materia. Had Congress intended for the term to be applicable throughout 
the Code, it would have included “cure” as a set definition, not as an 
amendment inserted in three separate chapters. Congress’s decision to do so 
created the present confusion in the Eleventh Circuit. What seems to be present 
in this disparity is Congress sought to correct what it perceived to be either an 
unjust or incorrect decision by the Court in Rake. In passing the statute as it 
did, however, Congress was unartful at best and overly broad at worst. 
As one law review article explained, “[i]nadvertent overruling 
underscores . . . that statutory overruling is a risky and uncertain business.”229 
                                                 
 224 Other circuits agree. See, e.g., In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1982) (“In short, ‘curing a 
default’ in Chapter 11 means the same thing as it does in Chapters 7 or 13: the event of default is remedied and 
the consequences are nullified.”).  
 225 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 620 F. App’x at 869. 
 226 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 423 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 227 In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 620 F. App’x at 869. 
 228 Id. (quoting In re Moody Nat’l SHS Houston H, LLC, 426 B.R. 667, 676 n. 5 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 2010)). 
 229 Bussel, supra note 9, at 946. It is also a plausible that a statutory construction contrary to Congress’s 
intent might well be overruled. In that same law review article, the author conducted a study in which he found 
congressionally “overruled decisions were disproportionately based on textualist reasoning in the courts.” 
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An “uncertain business,” that deserves a thorough and complete examination 
of the legislative history, impetuses, and motivations of the congressional 
action. By sticking one’s head in the sand, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
leaves the definition of “cure” to mean one thing in § 1123 and a different 
thing in § 1124. 
IV. A HYBRID PROPOSAL 
A. Alternatives and a Proposal 
Adopting the Ninth Circuit’s precedent pre-Pacifica does not necessarily 
preclude a creditor from receiving default-rate interest to be considered cured. 
For instance, any court would be hard-pressed to deny default interest to a 
creditor where the language of the loan, note, or contract explicitly stated 
default interest must be paid for the creditor to be cured in a reorganization 
scenario.230 At least one prominent firm, Jones Day, following JMPCC, 
advised clients to be “clear and consistent in enforcing their post-default rights 
. . . .”231 
While that approach, of course, would require an explicit provision about 
bankruptcy reorganization, a creditor would be well-served in including this 
language. And in doing so, the creditor would deny the debtor the argument 
that the creditor received a windfall as a result. As the Bankruptcy Court for 
the Northern District of California proffered, allowing a debtor to avoid paying 
default-rate interest to effectuate a cure may comply with the “underlying 
agreement” if the contract is void of any provision requiring default-rate 
interest for purposes of calculating a cure.232 Because “curing,” according to 
the Ninth Circuit, continues to mean returning parties to their positions prior to 
default, such an interpretation “accord[s]” with the “underlying agreement.”233 
This rendition would encounter resistance in the Fifth Circuit, which has held 
                                                                                                                 
Bussel, supra note 9, at 908–10; see also Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence Through a Bankruptcy Lens: A 
Study in the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 118 (1996) (arguing textualism is 
not the proper approach to interpreting the Code).  
 230 Eleventh Circuit Weighs In on Section 1123(d): Reinstatement of Defaulted Loan Agreement Under 
Chapter 11 Plan Requires Payment of Default-Rate Interest, JONES DAY, http://www.jonesday.com/Eleventh-
Circuit-Weighs-In-on-Section-1123d-Reinstatement-of-Defaulted-Loan-Agreement-Under-Chapter-11-Plan-
Requires-Payment-of-Default-Rate-Interest-11-17-2015/?RSS=true?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium= 
syndication&utm_campaign=LinkedIn-integration (last visited January 13, 2016).  
 231 Id. 
 232 In re Zamani, 390 B.R. 680, 686 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 233 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (2012).  
DEAN GALLEYPROOFS2 6/19/2017 10:34 AM 
2017] FINDING A CURE 557 
that “curing” refers to placing parties in their positions prebankruptcy, not pre-
default.234 
Moreover, should a state statute provide that default-rate interest is due in 
the instance of chapter 11 cures, this situation would also pose challenges for 
debtors seeking to evade payment of default-rate interest. A second option 
available to states inclined to preserve a debtor’s power would be to amend 
their respective laws to prevent creditors from collecting default-rate interest to 
conform with § 1123(d). The second option seems to be an implicit alternative 
Judge Isgur offers in In re Moody.235 A state law preventing such an 
occurrence would conceivably preempt bankruptcy courts from requiring the 
default-rate interest. At least one state has expressly granted creditors the 
option to collect interest on interest in certain cases.236 
According to one survey, Congress overruled 54% of cases in which the 
courts used a textualist or primarily textualist interpretation of the Code,237 and 
it can do so here.238 Congress can clarify what constitutes a cure in one of three 
ways. First, Congress could define “cure” in § 101, the Code’s definition 
section. This addition would render “cure” a fungible term throughout the 
Code, including chapter 13. Second, Congress could add an additional 
provision to § 1124 specifying what “cure” means for the purposes of 
impairment.  
The first two options, at the very least, would remove any tension or 
inconsistency. If Congress deems it necessary to define cure in a different 
manner for the purposes of what constitutes a cured claim for impairment 
versus contents of a plan, Congress could simply insert the language from 
§ 1123(d) into § 1124 entirely.  
Finally, and what this author suggests, Congress should remove § 1123(d) 
and replace it with a more precise definition of “cure” that would return the 
parties to their positions pre-default. Doing so would also restore the definition 
several courts, save for the Fifth Circuit, adopted before Congress’s 
amendment. 
                                                 
 234 In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d 1054, 1059 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 235 In re Moody Nat’l SHS Houston H, LLC, 426 B.R. 667, 674 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 236 1995 GA. LAWS 432 (S.B. No. 408). 
 237 Bussel, supra note 9, at 909 (table 1).  
 238 But see Lawless, supra note 229, at 119 (“[I]nterest-group politics make congressional action 
infrequent and incomplete.”).  
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CONCLUSION 
When clear language is present, courts must afford such language great 
weight and not take it lightly. But, an analysis that distorts Congress’s intent, 
while relying solely upon the perceived plain language, does not further public 
interest and does a disservice to parties in bankruptcy. The path the Eleventh 
Circuit took is eerily similar to how one commentator described the Supreme 
Court’s action in another bankruptcy case involving textual interpretation: “If 
the text alone seems to us to give [the authority], in settling the law on this 
point, we will not weigh any considerations based on history, bankruptcy 
policy and administration, or extrinsic evidence of what Congress really 
intended.”239 
If parties are to be returned to their pre-default status, which is what many 
circuits determined cure to mean, then ostensibly default-rate interest would 
not be absolute under the statutory language itself. That exact problem is an 
example of the strictly textualist approach’s pitfall in the bankruptcy context. 
As the court in In re Sweet noted, the absence of state legislation combined 
with an unclear underlying agreement, leaves us back where we started: an 
ambiguous statute within the Code deserving of full analysis. 
The precedent of the Ninth Circuit pre-Pacifica is preferable to the 
Eleventh Circuit’s approach. The Ninth Circuit’s approach promotes the 
primary goal of chapter 11, would not unnecessarily harm undersecured 
creditors, and does not create “tension” within the Code. Lastly, an 
understanding that “cure” places the parties in the same position they were pre-
default does not foreclose upon a creditor’s rights unless the language in the 
contract or agreement explicitly calls for default-rate interest for the purposes 
of “cure” and the agreement does not contravene Code principles established in  
 
  
                                                 
 239 Bussel, supra note 9, at 897. The author, Daniel J. Bussel, was even more blistering later in the article. 
See id. (writing “agnostic stance with respect to the practical consequences, purpose, and efficacy of a 
particular construction is an essential characteristic of textualism. Textualists do not deny their agnosticism”). 
The Eleventh Circuit was similarly agnostic in In re Sagamore Partners by refusing to even discuss, much less 
give credence to, the legislative history surrounding the Act’s passage. In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 620 F. 
App’x 864, 869 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997)) (“Given this 
‘straightforward statutory command’ in § 1123(d), ‘there is no reason to resort to legislative history.’”). 
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the courts, such as the prohibition against collecting both fees and default 
interest. 
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